


# IOTA TUTORIAL 6

## Why you should not reuse an address for outgoing txs



# INTRO

- In this video I will explain why you should not reuse an IOTA address for **outgoing** transactions.

# DIGITAL SIGNATURES

- Digital signatures are used for authentication, integrity checking and non-repudiation.
- Development of quantum computers threatens the security of currently used digital signature algorithms such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
- Cryptographers developed a variety of quantum-resistant alternatives of which hash based signatures are the most promising.
- Hash based signatures are based on so called **One Time Signatures** (OTS). The term implies that a single public/private key pair must only be used once. Otherwise, an attacker is able to reveal more parts of the private key and spoof signatures.

# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- In 1979 Leslie Lamport created a method to construct digital signatures using only cryptographically secure one way hash functions.
- This method is called the Lamport signature or Lamport One Time Signature (OTS) scheme.
- Other One Time Signature schemes are the Merkle OTS and Winternitz OTS.
- The Lamport One Time Signature scheme is very easy to understand and is **VERY LOOSELY** comparable to Winternitz OTS.
- For simplicity's sake I will be using the Lamport One Time Signature scheme explaining why you should never reuse an IOTA address for outgoing transactions.



# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Alice uses a random number generator and produces two pairs of 256 random numbers, total 512 numbers. Each random number is 256 bits in size. These random numbers forms the private key.


## Private Key



**Each random number is 256 bits in size**

# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Each of the 512 random numbers are separately hashed, using for example SHA-256. These hashed random numbers forms the public key.



# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME


- Alice has a document (or transaction data) which is hashed using SHA-256.  
The document hash is of course 256 bits long: **101...011**
- Alice wants to create a digital signature for her document.  
She applies the following procedure:
  - Loop thru each bit (n) of the hash from 0-255.
  - If the bit is a 0, publish the n<sup>th</sup> number from pair 0.
  - If the bit is a 1, publish the n<sup>th</sup> number from pair 1.
  - When all bits are looped, destroy all unused numbers from pair 0 and 1.
- This produces a sequence of 256 random numbers.




# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- The document hash: **101..011**

## Private Key




- The digital signature is a sequence of 256 random numbers.





# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME


- After the digital signature is created, delete all unused numbers from the private key.




- The digital signature consist half of the private key, the other 256 random numbers are still unknown and thus nobody can create signatures that fit other message hashes.

# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Alice sends her document, together with the corresponding digital signature and public key to Bob.




## Public Key



# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Bob wants to verify Alice's document signature.  
He first hashes the document using SHA-256.  
The document hash is again: **101...011**
- Bob follows the same steps when Alice created the digital signature, but instead uses the public key.

## Public Key






# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Bob produces a sequence of 256 hashes picked from Alice's public key.



- Bob now hashes each of the random number in the digital signature.



- If both sequence of hash numbers match then the signature is ok.

# LAMPORT ONETIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- The Lamport signature creates a digital signature which reveals part of the private key.
- The private key has 512 numbers and using it once will reveal 256 numbers.
- Using the private key twice weakens the security of the scheme again by half. The probability of an attacker being able to successfully forge a signature for a given message increases from  $1/2^{256}$  to  $1/2^{128}$ .
- A third signature using the same key would increase the probability of a successful forgery to  $1/2^{64}$  and a fourth signature to  $1/2^{32}$ , and so on.

# LAMPORT ONE TIME SIGNATURES SCHEME

- Please note IOTA's signature scheme is based on the Winternitz One Time Signature (WOTS) scheme and is **NOT** the same as the Lamport signature scheme.
- However by using the Lamport One Time Signature scheme I am trying to give you a very simplistic understanding why you should never reuse an IOTA address for outgoing transactions.